3. Consider the unilateral model of precaution. Recall that only the injurer can inuence accident prevention in this model. Suppose the unit cost of precaution is $1. The probability of an accident is given by 3300 = e''1", where x 2 0 is the level of precaution. When an accident occurs, the victim suffers a xed $10,000 in harm. Although the liability rule is strict liability, the injurer escapes detection (and hence liability) with a probability of 0.75. For simplicity, assume there are no litigation costs. a. What is the socially optimal level of precaution? b. Suppose punitive damages are prohibited and courts award compensatory damages precisely equal to the victim's harm. What level of precaution does the injurer choose under strict liability? c. Suppose instead that courts properly award punitive damages and that they set compensatory damages precisely equal to the victim's harm. What is the size of the optimal punitive damages award? (1. What level of precaution does the injurer choose under strict liability given the optimal punitive damages award in part (c) above