3. Cournot Competition With Asymmetric Marginal Costs (30 points) 2 Suppose that total demand in the market for cement is Q = 450 - 2p. Firm 1's marginal cost is $50. Firm 2's marginal cost is $40. A technological innovation allows firms to reduce marginal cost by $6. The firms compete on quantities (Cournot competition). a. (10 points) Draw the best response curves for Firm 1 and Firm 2 without the technological innovation. b. (5 points) Determine the equilibrium production choices in the Cournot equilibrium without the technological innovation. c. (10 points) On the same graph as Part a., draw the best response curves if Firm 1 acquired the technological innovation (but Firm 2 did not). d. (5 points) How much would Firm 1 be willing to pay for the innovation if it were the only firm to acquire it?