3. In the Godfather, two criminal organizations, the Corleone family and the Bazzini family, fight for control over lucrative illegal activity. Within each crime family, there are two squads, each of which is controlled by its own captain. Thus, there are four captains in all, two from the Corleone family, and two from the Barzini family. Each captain can pay a cost to mount an attack (A) on the other family, or a captain can pay no cost and wait (W). In order to win the conflict, one side must generate a strictly larger number of attacks than the other. Thus, if the number of attacks generated by each crime family is different, then the family that generated more attacks wins and the other loses. Inthis case, both of the captains on the side that won receive a benefit of 1, while both captains on the side that lost receive benefit 0 (note that these benefits do not include the cost of attack). If both sides generate the same number of attacks, then neitherside wins, and all four captains get a benefit of 0 (again, not including the attack cost). Suppose (in this part) that each crime family is run by a Don (boss), who directs the captains whether to attack. Each Don's payoff is the sum of the payoffs of the two captains under his command. Thus, each Don selects a number of attacks, 0, 1, or 2. Each attack costs The Don that orders strictly more attacks gets a benefit of 2, and the one who orders less gets 0. If both order the same number then both get benefit 0. The game between the Dons can be represented using the following matrix. Don Barzini 2 Attacks 1 Attack ( Attacks 2 Attacks - 10-4 1 Attack -410 140 9 Don Corleone 99 0 Attacks 0,19 0,14 0,0 9 (a) Underline each Don's best responses. Does a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exist in this game? Explain in a sentence or two. 3. In the Godfather, two criminal organizations, the Corleone family and the Bazzini family, fight for control over lucrative illegal activity. Within each crime family, there are two squads, each of which is controlled by its own captain. Thus, there are four captains in all, two from the Corleone family, and two from the Barzini family. Each captain can pay a cost to mount an attack (A) on the other family, or a captain can pay no cost and wait (W). In order to win the conflict, one side must generate a strictly larger number of attacks than the other. Thus, if the number of attacks generated by each crime family is different, then the family that generated more attacks wins and the other loses. Inthis case, both of the captains on the side that won receive a benefit of 1, while both captains on the side that lost receive benefit 0 (note that these benefits do not include the cost of attack). If both sides generate the same number of attacks, then neitherside wins, and all four captains get a benefit of 0 (again, not including the attack cost). Suppose (in this part) that each crime family is run by a Don (boss), who directs the captains whether to attack. Each Don's payoff is the sum of the payoffs of the two captains under his command. Thus, each Don selects a number of attacks, 0, 1, or 2. Each attack costs The Don that orders strictly more attacks gets a benefit of 2, and the one who orders less gets 0. If both order the same number then both get benefit 0. The game between the Dons can be represented using the following matrix. Don Barzini 2 Attacks 1 Attack ( Attacks 2 Attacks - 10-4 1 Attack -410 140 9 Don Corleone 99 0 Attacks 0,19 0,14 0,0 9 (a) Underline each Don's best responses. Does a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exist in this game? Explain in a sentence or two