3. Is the rule prohibiting trustees and other fiduciaries from making secret profits too strict?

No. On the contrary, the administration of trust settlements requires strict laws that can help trustees and other fiduciaries from engaging in fraudulent schemes using the property or assets entrusted to them. The main objective of the rule that prohibits trustees from making secret profits is to prevent conflicts of interest and unjust enrichment. The current legal understanding of fiduciary duty is based on the assumption that human beings are predisposed to act in ways that cater to their interests and the premise that humans have a weak conscience that cannot prevent them from acting selfishly when holding assets belonging to other people. For more than two hundred years now, it has become apparent that fiduciary liability is very severe. Nothing short of consent can be justified when it comes to administering trusts. The strict application of fiduciary duty continues to be exercised EQUITY AND TRUST 10 by English courts because judges appreciate the necessity of strict discipline to contain selfish impulses. Although the strictness has remained unchallenged for many years, some judges and commentators are starting to question the necessity of strict discipline regarding fiduciary duty. These opposing voices to strict fiduciary liability favour an approach that allows extenuating circumstances to be considered when trustees justify their decisions. Strict fiduciary liability is needed to regulate opportunism (Flannigan, 2004). When certain people are given the right to act in the interest of others, they invariably gain access to other people's assets. That access to other people's assets opens the way for trustees to act in their self-interests, going beyond their limited purpose commitments (Flannigan, 2006). In this respect, fiduciary accountability is an effective method of preventing potential opportunism. Limited access arrangements in trusteeship arise due to relations of necessity, i.e., relations arising from incapacity. For instance, parents act on behalf of their children while trustees act on behalf of unborn beneficiaries or infants. These relations must be devoid of mischief or opportunism, owing to the power imbalance that characterises them. However, it is impossible or ineffective to monitor for opportunistic behaviour of trustees all the time. Although there are other means of controlling opportunism, fiduciary accountability is the primary mechanism by which we ensure commitment to trust EQUITY AND TRUST 11 administration. Examples of English case law on the need for strict fiduciary liability include Boardman v Phibbs. In this particular case, the court rules that fiduciaries should not benefit from their position because the obligations of a trustee are rigorous. The strict approach to fiduciary duty was also used to decide A-G for Hong Kong v Reid by the Privy Council, where it was ruled that fiduciary should never take bribes or profits. While determining FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, the court of appeal held that Sinclair Investment Holdings v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd was determined correctly but declared that the secret commission paid to a Sinclair Investments Holdings agent must be treated as a constructive trust for the principal. Therefore, a trustee should not make any payment except authorized by the trust document/deed. This maxim is derived from the 'no conflict' principle, codified under section 28 of the Trustee Act 2000. This same principle that proscribes fiduciary from keeping secret profits can also be found in Keech v Sandford. Therefore, it is possible to justify the inflexibility that defines the law that prohibits trustees from keeping personal gains, considering that the remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty are regulatory rather than punitive.

I have attach answer can you add extra more word to 1000 and rewrite the answers.