3. Suppose a stage game with k 2 2 Nash equilibria, labeled 01, , 0k, is repeated T times (T is a nite number). All players' actions in a stage are revealed before the next stage starts. Players share a common discount factor 6 E (0,1). a) Consider the following strategy prole of the repeated game: \"Play 01 in every stage, regardless of history.\" Is this strategy prole necessarily a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game? Does your answer depend on 6? Carefully justify your answer. b) Consider strategy proles of the repeated game of the following form: \"Play at E {01, ..., 0k} in stage t.\" Note that in such a strategy prole, players can play differently in different stages (because 01, , 0T do not have to all be the same element of {01, , 0,5), but in a given stage, players cannot condition play on history. ls every strategy prole of this form necessarily a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game? Does your answer depend on 6? Carefully justify your