3. There are two airiiue carriers, United and American Airlines, that are deciding how many ights to run from Detroit (BTW) to Seattle (SEA) ever day. To simpiify the analysis, both rms can choose to run 0, 1, 2 or 3 ights per day. The payoffs for both rms is given in the table below. United a. If there was no collusion in this market, how many ights would each firm run every day? (5 pts} h. Suppose that the two carriers colluded and agreed to each run two ights per day. In addition, assume that United values next periods prot at only 90% of this period's prot and American values next period's prot at 80% of this period's prot. Solve for the value of collusion VB and the value of deviation V\" for both rms. Is this collusive agreement self enforcing? {5 pts) c. Suppose that the two carriers coiluded and agreed to each run two ights per day. In addition. assume that United values next periods prot at only 70% of this period's profit and American values next period's prot at 60% of this period's prot. Solve for the value of oollusion Va and the value of deviation V\" for both rms Is this collusive agreement self enforcing? (5 pts) :1. Suppose that the two carriers coiluded and agreed to each run one ight per day. In addition. assume that United values next periods prot at only 70% of this period's prot and American values next period's prot at 60% of this period's prot. Solve for the value of collusion VG and the value of deviation V\" for both rms. Is this collusive agreement self enforcing? (5 pts)