3. You decide to invest in a particular project and need to determine whether you should ask for a at return of $100,000 or a 15% cut of the rm's prot in return. Looking at the information, you decide that if the owners of the rm expend modest effort (say, $20,000 worth), they will generate $600,000 in prot. On the other hand, if they expend signicant effort ($50,000 worth), they will generate $1 million in prots. a. Create a payoff matrix that shows the two players strategies and payoffs. b. What is the equilibrium outcome of this game? 0. Suppose the owners come to you and promise that they will give it their all. Is this promise believable, given the Nash equilibrium you found above? 3. You decide to invest in a particular project and need to determine whether you should ask for a at return of $100,000 or a 15% cut of the rm's prot in return. Looking at the information, you decide that if the owners of the rm expend modest effort (say, $20,000 worth), they will generate $600,000 in prot. On the other hand, if they expend signicant effort ($50,000 worth), they will generate $1 million in prots. a. Create a payoff matrix that shows the two players strategies and payoffs. b. What is the equilibrium outcome of this game? 0. Suppose the owners come to you and promise that they will give it their all. Is this promise believable, given the Nash equilibrium you found above