3B. Consider the following two-player two-strategy game, where players are denoted A. B. strategies as s, t and utility functions uA, up are such that: UA(S, S) O. UB(S. S O, uA(s, t) = 6, up(s,t) = 2, uA(t, s) - 3, up(t, s) Lus(t, /) - 1. Then, if one denotes with a the probabilita that A chooses's, and with ? the probability that B chooses s, a Nash equilibrium in (properly) unxed strategies of the game is. 1/2 and is Pareto inefficient y - 5/8 and is Pareto efficient 5/ -2/3 and is Pareto inefficient 3 1/ -5/8 and is Pareto inefficient