4. [8] Professor Afano has a monopoly in the market for Intermediate Micro II textbooks. The time discounted value of Professor Afano's future earnings is 510,000. Professor Dinero is considering whether to release a competing book. Suppose that with two books on the market the time discounted value of each professor's future earnings will be $300. Professor Afano is considering strategies to deter Professor Dinero's entry. The professors know profits that are earned by both players in each of the two scenarios {with and without Dinero's entry) and this is a oneshot game with no counteroffers. Assess the rationality of each strategy. Explain your reasoning. a. 2] Professor Afano threatens to cut his price and attack the credibility of Professor Dinero's book through targeted social media ads. This would result in Professor Dinero osing SB and Professor Afano earning a timediscounted profit of 51100. b. '2] Professor Afano makes a sidedeal with Professor Dinero and pays him $200 to stay out of the market. In so doing, Professor Afano remains a monopolist {assume no other ootential entrants exist). c. 2] Professor Afano makes a sidedeal with Professor Dinero and pays him $1,000 to stay out of the market. In so doing, Professor Afano remains a monopolist {assume no other ootential entrants exist). d. 2] What is the minimum sidepayment that Professor Dinero would accept to forgo entry