4. A population of Hawks and Doves compete over food in an area. If a Hawk meets a Dove, the Hawk gets the food and the Dove ees; if a Dove meets a Dove, they share the food equally; and if a Hawk meets a Hawk, they ght and then consume what is left of the food. a) Draw the game in strategic form. [So, if V = value of the food and c = cost of ghting, then the payoff when a hawk meets another hawk, V(H|H) = (v-c)/2. ] b) Under what circumstances can Doves survive with Hawks? Explain how/why the ESS changes as the values of v and c change. [When v > c, is there a pure evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)? What if c > v? Find the mixed ESS only when there is no pure ESS. Then explain the changes] c) Can you relate your answers to the interpretation of a mixed strategy? What is the difference between a mixed Nash Equilibrium and a mixed ESS?)