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4 Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction in which the bidders' valuations are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Suppose that each bidder uses a

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4 Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction in which the bidders' valuations are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Suppose that each bidder uses a strategy of b(Vi) = avi. What is the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game when there are n bidders

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