4. Consider a variant of the Stag Hunt game. There are 1U hunters. 1n the touowmg, assume only a minimum of six; hunters are needed to capture the stag. A captured stag is equally shared only by the hunters who chose to hunt the stag. As before, a player gets payoff zero if he chooses Stag but the stag is not caught, and gets a payoff 1 if he chooses Hare regardless of other players' strategies. Other things equal, every player prefers a larger share of the stag. Find all Nash equilibria for the following two cases (for each case you need to explain why some strategy proles are Nash equilibria and why the others are not). Note that each case is a different game. Let V be the total value of the stag. (a) Assume V/ 10 .'> 1, namely, each hunter prefers 1/10 of the stag to a hare. (h) Assume g > 1 :> %, namely, each hunter prefers 1/7 of the stag to a hare, but would prefer a hare to 1/8 of the stag