4. Consider the following game. Player 1's actions are Enter (E) and Stay Out (SO). If he picks SO, the game ends (no player can take further actions). If he picks E, Player 2's actions are Fight (F) and Accommodate (A). Then after seeing Player 2's action, Player 1 plays again, with actions Leave (L) and Stay In (SI). The payoffs are: (-2,2) after E,F,L (-5,-5) after E,F,SI (-13) after E,A,L (1,1) after E,A,SI (0,4) after SO a) Is this a game of perfect information? Explain. b) Draw the extensive form [[and find the subgame-perfect equilibria.]] c) Show the normal form (leave it unreduced: make player l's strategies specify L or SI even after SO) and find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (m: There are ve.)