4. Consider the following two-person normal form game in which players can choose to cooperate (C) or defect (D). Assuming both >0 and >0, demonstrate the conditions under which Grim Trigger constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. For the purposes of this question, you can assume that each player will always be willing to carry out the punishment strategy of the game - that is, you need only check whether given a history in which both players have always cooperated, whether (or under what conditions) they will each continue to cooperate. 4. Consider the following two-person normal form game in which players can choose to cooperate (C) or defect (D). Assuming both >0 and >0, demonstrate the conditions under which Grim Trigger constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. For the purposes of this question, you can assume that each player will always be willing to carry out the punishment strategy of the game - that is, you need only check whether given a history in which both players have always cooperated, whether (or under what conditions) they will each continue to cooperate