4. Hawk-Dove game. Consider the following game between two spiders: Spider 1/Spider 2 Concede Fight Concede 5,5 0,10 Fight 10,0 XX The spiders are fighting for a web whose utility is 10. If one spider fights and the other concede, the first has the web. If neither fights they have a 50-50 chance to get the web. If they both fight they have again a 50-50 chance to get the web but there is also a possibility that they will be physically harmed. If the physical costs are higher than the expected value of the web, then X will be less than 0, otherwise it will be greater then 0. 1. Suppose that the payoff to winning the web is higher (than 10). Clearly explain how the payoff to (fight, fight) might change as well. What difference, if any, would that make to the analysis?~ 2. Show that what determines whether or not the spiders fight is the difference between the payoffs to fighting and conceding when the other spider chooses to fight.~ 3. Argue that both spiders conceding can never be a Nash equilibrium of this game. For what payoffs would this be the socially desirable outcome?<