4) Q11: Entry deterrence Recall the entry deterrence model from lecture 24, May 16: In stage 1 the incumbent chooses its quantity q. In stage 2 the new firm, E, makes the entry decision. If E chooses to enter, it pays the entry cost F, and chooses its quantity qr. If E stays out, the incumbent remains a monopolist, sells the q, units as determined in stage 1. The inverse market demand is p(Q) = 100- Q. The incumbent's cost function is C(q) = 20q. The entrant's cost function is C(q) = F + 20q. A. Show that if F = 225, the incumbent will deter entry. B. Show that if F = 225, entry deterrence reduces social welfare. C. Give one value for F for which the incumbent will deter entry AND entry deterrence improves social welfare