4. Suppose voters A, B, and C have preferences in two dimensions, x and y. Each voter's indifference curves are perfect circles about their ideal points. = (a) Suppose that the ideal points are (x, y) = (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3) for voters A, B, and C, respectively. Draw a graph showing these preferences. Suppose the status quo policy is S = (1,3). What, if any, policy P would you expect to to result? (b) Suppose preferences are like in part (a). Add two new voters, D and E to this diagram, but add them in such a way that they do not change P and where policies D and E are not on the line connecting policies A, B, and C. Explain. (c) Ignore D and E. Suppose voter B's ideal point is (3,1), but voters A and C are as before. What equilibrium do you expect to occur in this instance? Explain. (d) Suppose policies are like in part (c), but policies are voted upon one dimension at a time. What policy do you expect? Explain. 4. Suppose voters A, B, and C have preferences in two dimensions, x and y. Each voter's indifference curves are perfect circles about their ideal points. = (a) Suppose that the ideal points are (x, y) = (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3) for voters A, B, and C, respectively. Draw a graph showing these preferences. Suppose the status quo policy is S = (1,3). What, if any, policy P would you expect to to result? (b) Suppose preferences are like in part (a). Add two new voters, D and E to this diagram, but add them in such a way that they do not change P and where policies D and E are not on the line connecting policies A, B, and C. Explain. (c) Ignore D and E. Suppose voter B's ideal point is (3,1), but voters A and C are as before. What equilibrium do you expect to occur in this instance? Explain. (d) Suppose policies are like in part (c), but policies are voted upon one dimension at a time. What policy do you expect? Explain