5. A Sealed Bid, First-Price Auction. Suppose a particular object is being auctioned off and two players, Barry and Cary are bidding for the item. Let Barry's valuation be VBeny = 9 and Cary's be Vcary - 18. Also let the bidding intervals be restricted to $5 intervals. The game is depicted below. Cary $5 $10 $15 $20 SO 0, 13 0, 8 0, 3 0, - 2 Barry $5 2, 6.5 0, 8 0, 3 0, - 2 $10 - 1, 0 - .5, 4 0, 3 0, - 2 (5.A) If Barry and Cary both bid $5, show how the payoffs in the relevant cell are calculated. (2 points) (5.B) If Barry bids $5 and Cary bids $15, explain how the payoffs in the relevant cell are calculated. (2 points) (5.C) Using iterated dominance (dominated and dominant strategies, weak or strong and all that good stuff), find the Nash equilibrium bidding strategies for both players. You need to explain and justify your answers. (2 points) (5.D) Given the nature of the auction (and your results), what can you say about Barry's bidding strategy? Compare his equilibrium bid to his own true valuation and to Cary's. (2 points)