5. CHBQB in 1W'atson. [2 points) Consider a location game with ve regions on the beach in which a vendor can locate. The regions are arranged on a straight line, as in the original game discussed in the text. Instead of there being two vendors, as with the original game, suppose there are three vendors who simultaneously and independently select on which of the ve regions to lo cate. There are thirty consumers in each of the ve re gions; each consumer will walk to the nearest vendor and purchase a soda, generating $1.00 prot for the vendor. Assume that if some consumers are the same distance from the two or three nearest vendors, then these con sumers are split equally between these vendors. Can you rationalise the strategy of locating in region 1? If your answer is \"yes,\" describe a belief that makes locating at region 1 a best response. If your answer is \"no,\" nd a strategy that strictly dominates playing strategy 1