5. Consider the keyword auction for three slots with 50, 20, 10 clicks respectively. Suppose that five bidders i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 that have per-click values of 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 respectively. Then in the equilibrium in the ascending price auction, the first slot is obtained by (A) bidder i = 1. (B) bidder i = 2. (C) bidder i = 3. (D) bidder i = 4.

6. The price that is paid for the first slot is (A) 340. (B) 400. (C) 500. (D) 100.

7. The price that is paid for the second slot is (A) 440. (B) 400. (C) 500. (D) 100.