5. Consider the payoff matrix below. Players choose between the two strategies, Defect or Cooperate. Suppose this instantaneous game is played iteratively (over and over again), like in the Axelrod Tournament. Player 2 Defect Cooperate i@y | @y = (14) | (3,3) a) [4 marks] Fill in the table below. represents the Cooperate strategy and D represents the Defect strategy. For example, blue squares should be filled in with a strategy (C or D) and the yellow squares should be filled in with a number (total payoff after playing 8 rounds of the game). Who wins? Strategy | Round1 | Round2 | Round3 | Round4 | Round5 | Round& | Round7 | Round8 ;':21 Tit-for-Tat Player 2 C D C C D c D D b) [5 marks] Consider a new strategy employed in the Axelrod Tournament called trigger. Players playing trigger will cooperatie with you and will continue to cooperate until you defect against them. Once you defect against them, they will defect against you in all subsequent iterations. Fill in the table below assuming one player plays tit-for-taf and the other plays trigger. All blue and yellow squares must be filled in. Who wins? Strategy | Round1 | Round2 | Round3 | Round4 | Round5 | Round& | Round7 | Round8 ;;:1 Tit-for-Tat Trigger 6. [6 marks] Consider the Hawk-Dove game from lecture. Suppose, in this scenario, the Benefit is (B = 2) and the Cost is (C' = 4). What is the mixed strategy nash equilibrium for this game? Is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium evolutionary stable