5. In the Cournot model we did in class with two firms (q, and q, being the amounts produced by the two firms) the best response of firm 1 to q2 being firm 2's conjectured production is given by q1 = (3 -92)/2 or, rewriting, 2q1 + 92 = 3. Writing a similar expression for Player 2, we obtained q1 = q2 = 1 as the unique Nash equilibrium. If there are n firms in the market, the best response of firm 1 to 92, 93, .....; In can be calculated by choosing q1 to maximise {4 - (91 + 92 + 93.... + 9n) - 1}91 giving 291 + 92 + ..... + 9n = 3. Setting all the q equal, what is the Nash equilibrium, say, for n=5? What is the equilibrium price? Is (price-marginal cost) greater for n=5 than for n=2