5. Suppose that the proposer in the ultimatum game may not propose fractional amounts, and therefore must propose $0, $1, $2, ...,, or $10 (see figure below). As always, the responder must Accept (A) or Reject (R). $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 II KK***41203 A R ($6.54) (50.50) (a) Suppose, first, that this game is played by two egoists, for whom u(x,y)=x. Find all subgame-perfect equilibria in this game. (10 points) (b) Suppose, second, that this game is played by two altruists, for whom u(x.y)=23/x+13/y. Find all subgame-perfect equilibria in this game. (10 points) 5. Suppose that the proposer in the ultimatum game may not propose fractional amounts, and therefore must propose $0, $1, $2, ...,, or $10 (see figure below). As always, the responder must Accept (A) or Reject (R). $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 II KK***41203 A R ($6.54) (50.50) (a) Suppose, first, that this game is played by two egoists, for whom u(x,y)=x. Find all subgame-perfect equilibria in this game. (10 points) (b) Suppose, second, that this game is played by two altruists, for whom u(x.y)=23/x+13/y. Find all subgame-perfect equilibria in this game. (10 points)