6. (20 pts) Consider the following game. Player 2 cooperate cheat Player cooperate a, W b, x chea C, y d, z Assume a > c 2 d > b and w > x zz> y. i. (2 pts) What's the Nash Equilibrium(ia) of the game? ii. (3 pts) Is(Are) the Nash Equilibrium(ia) Pareto efficient? iii. (3 pts) Is(Are) the Nash Equilibrium(ia) Kaldor Hicks efficient? iv. (3 pts) Now suppose a = 8, b = -10, c = 2, d = -8, w = 4, x = 3, y = -9, z = -6. What is the NE? V. (5 pts) Let p = Player 1's belief that Player 2 cooperates when they cooperate. Thus, 1-p = prob(Player 2 defects when Player 1 cooperates). Similarly, define q = Player 2's belief that Player 1 cooperates when they cooperate and 1-q = Player 2's believe that Player 1 cheats when Player 2 cooperates. What's the lower bound on p and q to guarantee that (Cooperate, Cooperate) is the only NE? vi. (4 pts) Interpret your values solve in part (v) with respect to solutions to the Tragedy of the Commons