*7. Assume five members of a voting body A, B, C, D, and E. They have ideal points in a two-dimensional issue space, given by A: (1,4), B: (4,4), C: (2,2), D: (1, 1), and E: (2, 1), where the first coordinate gives a person's ideal policy on the X di- mension and the second coordinate gives the ideal policy on the Y dimension. Assume further that each member prefers an outcome closer to his or her ideal point to one further away. All votes are taken over X-Y policy bundles, so all proposalsare in the form of ordered pairs (x,y). Is there an equilibrium

proposal if the body uses majority rule?

Now suppose that player B has been appointed the sole agenda setter. If the status quo is at C's ideal point, can B con- struct an agenda that will lead eventually to her own ideal point being approved by the entire legislative body? If so, con- struct such an agenda (you may assume sincere voting, and that the agenda setter can always persuade legislators indif- ferent between two policy bundles to vote for the bundle.that she prefers). What theorem does this illustrate?