(7) In a Nash equilibrium of a Cournot duopoly, if Firm 1's output is zero, then Firm 2's output must be the same as their output if they were a monopolist in the market. (8) In a Nash equilibrium of a Cournot duopoly, if Firm 1's output is the same as their output if they were a monopolist in the market, then Firm 2's output must be zero. (9) Consider the second-price auction model discussed in class, where player i's valuation is vi. Bidding v:- is the only action that weakly dominates each of all other actions for player 2'. (10) Consider the same model as (9). Each action other than bidding vi is weakly domi- nated only by bidding v!- for player 2; ALL 4 QUESTllgig 91113 TRUE OR