7. In the game below, the U.S. president, George W. Bush, decides whether to invade Iraq in 2003. Iraq leader, Saddam Hussein, decides whether to cooperate or fight back. However, Saddam Hussein did not know the type of the U.S. he was dealing with. Nature Strong W/P=0.4 U.s Invade Weak Trag Cooperate Not Invade (60,40) Fight Back (-10,0) 10,300) Cooperate (40,40) Tra Invade Fight Back (10,90) U.S Not Invade (0,300) Is the strategy profile (Invade| Strong, Invade|Weak; Fight | Invade, Prob(Strong|Invade) = 0.4) a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium? Is the strategy profile (Not Invade Strong, Invade | Weak; Fight | Invade, Prob(Weak Invade) In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium = 1)