8. Consider a monopolist who has the following information where P is the price per unit and Q is the number of units of the good: Demand Curve for Class One Buyers: P = 20 Q Demand Curve for Class Two Buyers: P = 16 Q MC = Q TC = 20 +(1/2L22 a. Suppose that initially this monopolist cannot distinguish whether a buyer is in Class One or Class Two. Given this information nd this monopolist's market demand curve. b. Suppose that initially this monopolist cannot distinguish whether a buyer is in Class One or Class Two. Given this information nd this monopolist's prot maximizing quantity if the monopolist acts as a single price monopolist. c. Suppose that initially this monopolist cannot distinguish whether a buyer is in Class One or Class Two. Given this information nd this monopolist's prot maximizing price if the monopolist acts as a single price monopolist. (1. Suppose that initially this monopolist cannot distinguish whether a buyer is in Class One or Class Two. Given this information nd this monopolist's level of prots if the monopolist acts as a single price monopolist. e. Now, suppose that the monopolist can distinguish whether a buyer is in Class One or Class Two. The monopolist decides to practice third degree price discrimination. Given this information nd the quantity of the good that the monopolist will sell to Class One and the quantity of the good that the monopolist will sell to Class Two. Make sure that the sum of these two quantities is equal to the value you found in (b) for the prot maximizing quantity for the monopolist. f. Now, suppose that the monopolist can distinguish whether a buyer is in Class One or Class Two. The monopolist decides to practice third degree price discrimination. Given this information nd the prices for the good for Class One buyers and Class Two buyers. g. Now, suppose that the monopolist can distinguish whether a buyer is in Class One or Class Two. The monopolist decides to practice third degree price discrimination. Given this information nd the total prot the rm earns when it engages in third degree price discrimination. Does the rm earn greater prots by pursuing this strategy instead of the single price strategy You analyzed in (d)? 10. Consider the following games: a. April and Erika want to get sushi for dinner this Friday at 6:30 pm to celebrate the end of a great semester. They are debating going to Sushi Express or WW When Friday rolls around, neither of them remember where they agreed to go. Without contacting each other, they independently decide between the two options. The payoff matrix is shown below, with the left number in each cell referring to April's payoff, and the right number referring to Erika's payoff. Sushi Ex . ress i. Does April have a dominant strategy? ii. Does Erika have a dominant strategy? iii. What do you think the outcome of this game will be? b. Natalia is eating dinner at Sushi Express when she sees Jason enter the restaurant to order take out. Jason also sees Natalia. They both choose between talking or not talking. If both choose to talk, then they eat together in the restaurant and both get a payoff of 0. If Natalia chooses to talk and Jason chooses to not talk, Natalia gets a payoff of -2 and Jason gets a payoff of 1. If Jason chooses to talk and Natalia chooses to not talk, Jason gets a payoff of -3 and Natalia gets a payoff of 1. If both choose to not talk, they both get a payoff of 4. Represent this game in a payoff matrix that resembles the one in part (a). i. Does Natalia have a dominant strategy? ii. Does Jason have a dominant strategy? iii. What do you think the outcome of this game will be? iv. If we change the payoff Natalia and Jason get from both choosing % to 3, do you still expect the same outcome of this game? Explain