8. Consider the repeated game in which the following stage game is played twice. Player 2 Hawk Dove Player 1 Hawk 0, 0 3, 1 Dove 1, 3 2, 2 Playing (Dove, Hawk) in the first stage and (Hawk, Dove) in the second stage is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. A: True. For example, players can anticipate that they play (Hawk, Dove) in the second stage regardless of the outcome in the first stage. Then the total payoff of the repeated game is a function of the first stage outcome in the following way: Player 2 Hawk Dove Player 1 Hawk 3, 1 6, 2 Dove 4. 4 5,3 (Dove, Hawk) is a subgame perfect outcome in stage 1 because it is a NE of this updated game