8. If a cartel could form between these two firms, is it possible for them to make higher prots than the Nash Equilibria outcome? Would this be likely.r to be sustainable? Why or why not? Explain your answer. [3 points] Suppose thatwe are studying a rm that produces cars, and they exist in an oligopoly. Specifically, there are two firms in the market which produce cars that are basically identical. They are so close that they face they both share the same market demand. Suppose that market demand is given by: p = 200 osqn nd assume {for simplicity} that looth rms have a constant marginal cost of lm with zero fixed costs. Each rm has to decide between two prices they could set, which are either ii} $105 or {ii] 560. If both rms choose the same price, then they split the market {i.e. they each produce half of the market demand and earn the revenue for those units]. If the two rms choose different prices, then the rm with the lowest price takes all of the market demand at that price, and the firm with the highest price produces nothing (i.e. Cl: 0). 5. Fill in the following payoffs in the payoff matrix for this game. Show your work. [Note: the payoffs should he prots for both firms in each of the four possible outcomes] [4 points] E. Is 5105 the prot-maximizing price to set for a monopolist? How do you know? i.e. show your work. [2 points] I". IWhich outcomes; if any; are Nash Equilibria? How do you know? [2 points]