8 . INTRINSIC SOURCES: THE LINGUISTIC CANONS 289 290 8 . INTRINSIC SOURCES: THE LINGUISTIC CANONS (West "Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, sue for or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the ... [Allthough dictionary definitions of the words "tangible" and "object" bear fically, intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper admin- consideration, they are not dispositive of the meaning of "tangible object" in inding istration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency 1519.... catch- of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or con- The words immediately surrounding "tangible object" in $ 1519-"falsifies, or templation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, impris makes a false entry in any record [or] document"-also cabin the contextual meaning li? The ned not more than 20 years, or both." ... of that term.... [We rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis-a word is known by ... At the end of the Government's case in chief, [Yates] moved for a judgment the company it keeps-to "avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is ity and of acquittal on the $ 1519 charge. Pointing to$ 1519's title and its origin as a provision inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts States of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Yates argued that the section sets forth "a documents of- of Congress. ... I catch- fense" and that its reference to "tangible object [s]" subsumes "computer hard drives, The noscitur a sociis canon operates in a similar manner here. "Tangible object" is to limit logbooks, [and] things of that nature," not fish.... the last in a list of terms that begins "any record for] document." The term is therefore istent? The Government countered that a "tangible object" within $ 1519's compass is appropriately read to refer, not to any tangible object, but specifically to the subset lrafting 'simply something other than a document or record." The trial judge expressed mis- of tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e., objects used to record or preserve information. Thy did givings about reading "tangible object" as broadly as the Government urged: "Isn't there a Latin phrase [about] construction of a statute. ... The gist of it is . . . you This moderate interpretation of "tangible object" accords with the list of actions take a look at [a] line of words, and you interpret the words consistently. So if you're $ 1519 proscribes. The section applies to anyone who "alters, destroys, mutilates, 31 U.S. talking about documents, and records, tangible objects are tangible objects in the conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or imental nature of a document or a record, as opposed to a fish." The first-instance judge tangible object" with the requisite obstructive intent. (Emphasis added.) The last it does nonetheless followed controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. While recognizing that two verbs, "falsiffy]" and "mak[e] a false entry in," typically take as grammatical include $ 1519 was passed as part of legislation targeting corporate fraud, the Court of objects records, documents, or things used to record or preserve information, such change, Appeals had instructed that "the broad language of $ 1519 is not limited to corporate as logbooks or hard drives. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 720 (10th ed. 2014) fraud cases, and 'Congress is free to pass laws with language covering areas well be- (defining "falsifyinge deceptive; to counterfeit, forge, or misrepresent; yond the particular crisis du jour that initially prompted legislative action."" Accord- esp., to tamper with (a document, record, etc.)"). It would be unnatural, for ex- :turn to ingly, the trial court read "tangible object" as a term "independent" of "record" or ample, to describe a killer's act of wiping his fingerprints from a gun as "falsifying" justices "document." ... the murder weapon. But it would not be strange to refer to "falsifying" data stored On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found the text of $ 1519 "plain." Because "tangible on a hard drive as simply "falsifying" a hard drive. Furthermore, Congress did not ice how cuss the object" was "undefined" in the statute, the Court of Appeals gave the term its "ordinary include on $ 1512(c)(1)'s list of prohibited actions "falsifies" or "makes a false entry in." See $ 1512(c)(1) (making it unlawful to "alter], destroly], mutilate], or najority or natural meaning," i.e., its dictionary definition, "[hlaving or possessing physical cussion form." (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1592 (9th ed. 2009)). We granted certiorari conceall] a record, document, or other object" with the requisite obstructive in- and now reverse the Eleventh Circuit's judgment.... tent ) . ... The ordinary meaning of an "object" that is "tangible," as stated in dictionary defi- A canon related to noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, counsels: "Where general nitions, is "a discrete ... thing," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1555 words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are [usually] (2002), that "possess[es] physical form," Black's Law Dictionary 1683 (10th ed. 2014) construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by From this premise, the Government concludes that "tangible object," as that term ap- the preceding specific words." In Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142-143 (2008), pears in $ 1519, covers the waterfront, including fish from the sea. Whether a statutory for example, we relied on this principle to determine what crimes were covered by TS, C.J., term is unambiguous, however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its the statutory phrase "any crime ... that ... is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves component words. Rather, "[the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is de- use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk eral wa- termined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific of physical injury to another," [citation omitted]. The enumeration of specific crimes, ; that he context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a we explained, indicates that the "otherwise involves" provision covers "only similar ect catch whole." Ordinarily, a word's usage accords with its dictionary definition. In law as in crimes, rather than every crime that 'presents a serious potential risk of physical injury ating 18 life, however, the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different to another." Had Congress intended "tangible object" in $ 1519 to be interpreted so things. ... generically as to capture physical objects as dissimilar as documents and fish, Congress would have had no reason to refer specifically to "record" or "document." The Gov-8 . INTRINSIC SOURCES: THE LINGUISTIC CANONS 293 294 8 . INTRINSIC SOURCES: THE LINGUISTIC CANONS in the [The plurality turns to] noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. The first of those re- v does lated canons advises that words grouped in a list be given similar meanings. The what a neighbor, when asked to identify something similar to record or document, second counsels that a general term following specific words embraces only things might answer. [Who wouldn't raise an eyebrow, the concurrence wonders, if the to file- of a similar kind. According to the plurality, those Latin maxims change the English neighbor said crocodile? Courts sometimes say, when explaining the Latin maxims, isistent meaning of "tangible object" to only things, like records and documents, "used to that the words of a statute should be interpreted consistent with their neighbors. The record or preserve information." But understood as this Court always has, the canons concurrence takes that expression literally. t every have no such transformative effect on the workaday language Congress chose. But 1519's meaning should not hinge on the odd game of Mad Libs the concurrence ething As an initial matter, this Court uses noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis to resolve proposes. No one reading 1519 needs to fill in a blank after the words records and atute's ambiguity, not create it. Those principles are "useful rule[s] of construction where documents. That is because Congress, quite helpfully, already did so adding the term t Con- words are of obscure or doubtful meaning." But when words have a clear definition, tangible object. The issue in this case is what that term means. So if the concurrence isive or and all other contextual clues support that meaning, the canons cannot properly wishes to ask its neighbor a question, I'd recommend a more pertinent one: Do you Con- defeat Congress's decision to draft broad legislation. See, e.g., Ali, 552 U. S., at 227 think a fish (or, if the concurrence prefers, a crocodile) is a tangible object? As to ins ap- (rejecting the invocation of these canons as an "attempt to create ambiguity where that query, who wouldn't raise an eyebrow if the neighbor said no? er is it the statute's text and structure suggest none") In insisting on its different question, the concurrence neglects the proper function Anyway, assigning "tangible object" its ordinary meaning comports with noscitur of catchall phrases like "or tangible object." The reason Congress uses such terms is enting. a sociis and ejusdem generis when applied, as they should be, with attention to $ 1519's precisely to reach things that, in the concurrence's words; do[ ] not spring to mind nition subject and purpose. Those canons require identifying a common trait that links all to my mind, to my neighbor's, or (most important) to Congress's. As this Court re- ust ac- the words in a statutory phrase. In responding to that demand, the plurality charac- cently explained: [T]he whole value of a generally phrased residual [term] is that it serves as a catchall for matters not specifically contemplated known unknowns. Con- ssesse terizes records and documents as things that preserve information -and so they are. m. See But just as much, they are things that provide information, and thus potentially serve gress realizes that in a game of free association with record and document, it will never think of all the other things including crocodiles and fish whose destruction :dinary as evidence relevant to matters under review. And in a statute pertaining to obstruction ers fish of federal investigations, that evidentiary function comes to the fore. The destruction or alteration can (less frequently but just as effectively) thwart law enforcement. And of records and documents prevents law enforcement agents from gathering facts rel- so Congress adds the general term or tangible object again, exactly because such evant to official inquiries. And so too does the destruction of tangible objects-of things do[ ] not spring to mind.' ly, who whatever kind. Whether the item is a fisherman's ledger or an undersized fish, throwing The concurrence suggests that the term tangible object serves not as a catchall for cue the it overboard has the identical effect on the administration of justice. For purposes physical evidence but to ensure beyond question that e-mails and other electronic rds "in of $ 1519, records, documents, and (all) tangible objects are therefore alike. .. files fall within 1519's compass. But that claim is eyebrow-raising in its own right. 2." And And the plurality's invocation of $ 1519's verbs does nothing to buttress its canon- Would a Congress wishing to make certain that 1519 applies to e-mails add the phrase isputed based argument. The plurality observes that $ 1519 prohibits "falsifying]" or "mak[ing] tangible object (as opposed, say, to electronic communications)? Would a judge or Context a false entry in" a tangible object, and no one can do those things to, say, a murder jury member predictably find that tangible object encompasses something as virtual es only weapon (or a fish). But of course someone can alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal, or as e-mail (as compared, say, with something as real as a fish)? If not (and the answer cover up such a tangible object, and $ 1519 prohibits those actions too. The Court is not), then that term cannot function as a failsafe for e-mails.... of the has never before suggested that all the verbs in a statute need to match up with all in line the nouns. And for good reason. It is exactly when Congress sets out to draft a statute ; Third broadly- to include every imaginable variation on a theme-that such mismatches Points for Discussion ignized will arise. To respond by narrowing the law, as the plurality does, is thus to flout 1. Statutory Language: What was the language at issue? What did each party want pes of both what Congress wrote and what Congress wanted.... that language to mean? What meaning did the plurality, concurrence, and Federal The concurring opinion is a shorter, vaguer version of the plurality's. It relies pri- dissent adopt? list of marily on the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons, tries to bolster them with make 1519 s list of verbs, and concludes with the section s title.... From those familiar ma- Those 7. The concurrence contends that when the noscitur and ejusdem canons are in play, known un- terials, the concurrence arrives at the following definition: tangible object should knowns should be similar to known knowns, i.e., here, records and documents. But as noted above, $ 1519 mean something similar to records or documents. In amplifying that purported guid- records and documents are similar to crocodiles and fish as far as 1519 is concerned: All are potentially . . ance, the concurrence suggests applying the term tangible object in keeping with useful as evidence in an investigation. The concurrence never explains why that similarity isn't the relevant one in a statute aimed at evidence-tampering.288 8 . INTRINSIC SOURCES: THE LINGUISTIC CANONS writing, or other matter or thing." Id. at 343 (citing Cal. Penal Code $ 135 (West 2015)). The defendant flushed marijuana down the prison toilet. The issue for the court was whether marijuana was "documentary evidence," specifically, whether it was covered by the broad catch-all: "other matter or thing." Finding he language clear, the court refused to apply ejusdem generis to limit the catch- all to paper-like items. Id. at 344. Which of these two cases was similar to the majority's approach in Ali? The dissents'? 6. Rule against Surplusage: What role did this canon play, if any, in the majority and dissents' opinions? In a case we will study in our next section (Begay v. Unites States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)), the majority used listed items to limit a similarly broad catch- all. The majority suggested that the listed items must have been included to limit the broad catch-all or they would have been surplusage. Are these cases consistent 7. Drafting & Legislative History: According to the dissents, what did the drafting and legislative history show about the meaning of the language at issue? Why did the majority not consider that history? 8. Elephants in Mouseholes: In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), Justice Scalia wrote, "Congress ... does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes." Why did Justice Breyer include this quote? Essentially, if Congress intended to enact such a sweeping change, Congress would have made that intent clearer. * * * Ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis are often discussed together. Let's return to Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). In the case excerpted below, the justices dispute the role and application of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Notice how both Justice Ginsburg and Kagan begin with the plain meaning, then discuss the canons, among other things. Why did Justice Alito concur rather than sign the majority opinion? How does the dissent respond to the majority and concurrence's discussion of these two canons? Yates v. United States Supreme Court of the United States 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) * JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court [in which ROBERTS, C.J., and BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., concur]. John Yates, a commercial fisherman, caught undersized red grouper in federal wa- ters in the Gulf of Mexico. To prevent federal authorities from confirming that he had harvested undersized fish, Yates ordered a crew member to toss the suspect catch into the sea. For this offense, he was charged with, and convicted of, violating 18 U.S.C. $ 1519, which provides