[8] Professor Afano has a monopoly in the market for Intermediate Micro II textbooks. The time- discounted value of Professor Afano's future earnings is $10,000. Professor Dinero is considering whether to release a competing book. Suppose that with two books on the market the time- discounted value of each professor's future earnings will be $300. Professor Afano is considering strategies to deter Professor Dinero's entry. The professors know profits that are earned by both players in each of the two scenarios (with and without Dinero's entry) and this is a one-shot game with no counteroffers. Assess the rationality of each strategy. Explain your reasoning. a. [2] Professor Afano threatens to cut his price and attack the credibility of Professor Dinero's book through targeted social media ads. This would result in Professor Dinero losing $8 and Professor Afano earning a time-discounted profit of $700. b. [2] Professor Afano makes a side-deal with Professor Dinero and pays him $200 to stay out of the market. In so doing, Professor Afano remains a monopolist (assume no other potential entrants exist). c. [2] Professor Afano makes a side-deal with Professor Dinero and pays him $1,000 to stay out of the market. In so doing, Professor Afano remains a monopolist (assume no other potential entrants exist). d. [2] What is the minimum side-payment that Professor Dinero would accept to forgo entry