8:06 PM Tue Aug 16 . . . @ 39% environment claims. HN5[ ] * * * Webb appeals only the adverse judgments on the religious discrimination and sex discrimination claims. Our most recent decision in this area is Fraternal Order She also raises, for the first time on appeal, certain of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark. 170 constitutional claims. The District Court had jurisdiction F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). In Fraternal Order of Police, we pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1367. We have held the government cannot discriminate between jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. $ 1291. conduct that is secularly motivated and similar conduct that is religiously motivated. The Newark police department forbade police officers from growing beards but granted medical exceptions for beards as required by II. HN3 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S. C. $ 12112. employers from discharging or disciplining an employee Two Muslim police officers, whose religion required they based on his or her religion. 42 U.S. C. $ 2000e-2(a)(1). grow beards, filed suit contending their First Amendment "Religion" is defined as "all aspects of religious rights were infringed upon by the no-beards policy. We observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an agreed, holding that the police department must create a employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably religious exemption to its "no-beards" policy to parallel its accommodate to an employee's . . . religious observance secular one, unless it could make a substantial showing or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the as to the hypothetical negative effects of a religious employer's business." 42 U. S.C. $ 2000e(i). To establish exemption. a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the employee must show: (1) she holds a sincere religious In a similar case, a sister court of appeals determined "[a] belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she police department cannot be forced [**10] to let informed her employer of the conflict; and (3) she was individual officers add religious symbols to their official disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting uniforms." Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 506 requirement. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 224. Once all factors (5th Cir. 2001). In Daniels, a police officer refused to are established, the burden shifts to the employer to remove a gold cross pin on his uniform, in non- show either it made a good-faith effort to reasonably compliance with a no-pins official policy. Id. at 501. accommodate the religious belief, or such an Because the "Supreme Court has upheld appropriate accommodation would work an undue hardship upon the restrictions on the First Amendment rights of government employer and its business. Id. 2 of 4mployees, specifically including both military and police8:07 PM Tue Aug 16 @ 39% BuyLUVIT Webb v. City of Philadelphia uniform standards," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Commissioner Johnson identified and articulated the Circuit determined the City's uniform standards were police department's religious neutrality (or the proper and the City was unable to reasonably appearance of neutrality) as vital in both dealing with the accommodate the officer's religious public and working together cooperatively. "In sum, in my needs [*261] without undue hardship. Id. at 503. Other professional judgment and experience, it is critically courts have recognized the interests of a governmental important to promote the image of a disciplined, entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, identifiable and impartial police force by maintaining the e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago. 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Philadelphia Police Department uniform as a symbol of Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) ("The importance of neutral government authority, free from expressions of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so personal religion, bent or bias." Commissioner Johnson's great that a police department or a fire department. . . testimony was not contradicted or [**13] challenged by should be able to plead 'undue hardship' . . . ."); Paulos Webb at any stage in the proceedings. v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality Commissioner Johnson's reasoning is supported by in [**11] preserving nonpartisan police force and Kelley and Goldman. As [*262] a para-military entity, the appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Philadelphia Police Department requires "a disciplined Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers. 413 U. S. 548. rank and file for efficient conduct of its affairs." Kelley, 425 565, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1973) ("[I]t is not U.S. at 242 (internal citations omitted); see also Thomas only important that the Government and its employees in v. Whalen, 51 F.3d 1285, 1291 (6th Cir. 1995) ("A fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical paramilitary law enforcement unit, such as the police, has that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if many of the same interests as the military in regulating its confidence in the system of representative Government employees' uniforms."). Commissioner Johnson's is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent."). thorough and uncontradicted reasons for III. refusing [**14] accommodations are sufficient to meet the more than de minimis cost of an undue burden. The District Court held Webb established a prima facie Hardison. 432 U.S. at 84 case of religious discrimination. We agree. Webb's religious beliefs are sincere, her employer understood th 3 of 4 Respite Webb's assertions, Fraternal Order of Police is conflict hetween her beliefs and her employment distinguishable from this case. The focus of Fraternal8:07 PM Tue Aug 16 . . . @ 39% Page 4 of 4 Webb v. City of Philadelphia whether the police department authorized or was even aware of the alleged occurrences. These blanket assertions with no specific evidence do not create a genuine issue of material fact. . . . The District Court's grant of summary judgment was proper. IV. HN7 Before bringing suit under Title VII in federal court, a plaintiff must first file a charge with the EEOC. See Hicks v. ABT Assocs. Inc., 572 F. 2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1978); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1976). The purpose of this administrative exhaustion requirement is to put the EEOC on notice of the plaintiff's claims and afford it "the opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion, avoiding unnecessary action in court." Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Hicks, 572 F.2d at 963. While we have recognized the "preliminary requirements for a Title VII action are to be [*263] interpreted in a nontechnical fashion," the aggrieved party "is not permitted to bypass the administrative process." Ostapowicz. 541 F.2d at 398. Accordingly, we have held "the parameters of the civil action in the district court are defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." ! 4 of 4 at 398-99.8:06 PM Tue Aug 16 . . . 39% Directive 78 restricts what constitutes a permissible police