9. Problems and Applications Q9 Little l(ona is a small coffee company that is considering entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's prot depends on whether Little l(ona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price: Big Brew High Price LowI Price Enter 52 million, 53 million -$1 million. $1 million Little Kona Don't Enter 50, 5? million $0. $2 million True or False: Only Big Brew has a dominant strategy in this game. 0 True 0 False Which of the following outcomes represent a Nash equilibrium in this case? Check all that apply. D Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters. D Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters. D Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter. D Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, \"If you enter, we're going to set a low price, so you had better stay out.\"r True or False: Little Kona should not believe the threat. 0 True 0 False If the two rms could collude and agree on how to split the total prots, what outcome would they pick? 0 Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter. 0 Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter. 0 Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters. 0 Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters. Continue witho uI savin g