9.3 Technology, Terrain, and Application: Taliban's Viability in Afghanistan Tactics: Schelling's Inherent Propensity toward Peace or War O'Sullivan's three-dimensional model is applicable to the Taliban's continued viability in Afghanistan. Following According to Nobel-prize economist Thomas Schelling, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the USA certain configurations of weapons technologies, attacked Taliban forces in Afghanistan due to their geography, and military organization can push support of al Qaeda. Although the Taliban was adversaries toward peace or war, independent of the initially decimated in Afghanistan, they were able to rivals' preferences, perceptions, and goals (Schelling establish new command centers in mountainous areas 1960, chs. 9 and 10, 1966, ch. 6, Schelling and Halperin of central and eastern Afghanistan and tribal areas of 1961, chs. 1 and 2).1 In Schelling's (1966, p. 234) northwestern Pakistan. The remoteness and difficult words, "There is, then, something that we might call terrain of the mountainous areas has made it difficult for the 'inherent propensity toward peace or war' embodied Afghanistan's and Pakistan's military forces to dislodge in the weaponry, the geography, and the military the Taliban. In 2016, the Taliban leveraged its viability organization of the time." Here we develop Schelling's in the remote areas to carry out 1,064 terrorist attacks inherent propensity concepts using the Lanchester in Afghanistan with estimated fatalities of 5,043, with (1916) war model. most strikes occurring in the central and eastern portions of the country (Global Terrorism Database 2017).Basic Lanchester Model of War Attrition Prior to war, suppose playersA andB hold military stocks N13 and [VIZ . The superscripts indicate that these are the players' initial or time-zero weapons holdings prior to the outbreak of war. Suppose now that A attacks B. The basic Lanchester model describes the attrition of the military stocks of the two sides with the following differential equations: MA = dMB (9-3) MB = a,,MA. (9-4) The IVA and 1MB terms on the left side are the rates of change of the players' military stocks during the war. For example, if time is measured in months and 1MA = 100 at a point during the war, then A would be losing 100 weapons per month. The parameters a\" and [3d, sometimes called attrition coefficients, describe the effectiveness of each side's weapons in destroying the other's weapons when A is the attacker and B the defender. Consistent with Schelling, we assume that the coefcients reect the speed and accuracy of weapons, geographic impediments or enhancements to ghting ability, and effectiveness of military organization and training. The M A and MB terms represent the military stocks of the players at a point in time during the war. Because attrition causes these stocks to change over time, M A and M B are functions of time. In the basic Lanchester model, the winner in a ght- to-thenish war is determined when the rival's military stock is driven to zero. Given the pre-war stocks 'Wi 'Ml; , this means that when A initiates war, equations (g) and () mathematically determine the winner in accordance with the Lanchester square law (Taylor w, v. 1, pp. 7274): and O'Sullivan's Pyramid model of spatial distribution of military power applied to the Taliban in Afghanistan. On pages 171-172 in the textbook, the authors describe how the Taliban re- established their home base after the initial U.S. attack in 2001. a. Look at a map of Afghanistan. Assume Kabul is the U5. home base in the country and the Taliban has adjusted as indicated in the textbook. Draw a pyramid model, showing U5. and Taliban home bases and spheres of influence. b. As the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of the war, describe how the pyramids would change and the effect on the outcome of the war