A 3 4 1. Write in t 2. Compute the payoffs at time t+1 if the population at time t 3. Find all dynamic equilibria and all pure strategy ESS of a 4. EXTRA CREDIT Determine stability/instability of as many he payoffs for player 2, based on the assumptions of a one-population evolution model. is (3/6,2/6,1/6) and base fitness is1 single population model based on the given game mixed equilibria as you can. A 3 4 1. Write in t 2. Compute the payoffs at time t+1 if the population at time t 3. Find all dynamic equilibria and all pure strategy ESS of a 4. EXTRA CREDIT Determine stability/instability of as many he payoffs for player 2, based on the assumptions of a one-population evolution model. is (3/6,2/6,1/6) and base fitness is1 single population model based on the given game mixed equilibria as you can