{a} Does this game have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Explain. Let p1[n) denote the probability with which player 1 [the row player) plays strategy a, and let 311(5) be the probability with which she plays strategy it Let pgfa} be the probability with which player 2 [the oohunn player} plays strategy .1, 192(5) the probability with which he plays strategy h, and pg {c} the probability with which he plays strategy c. {b} Show that there is no mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium where pgfa} 2::- l}, Ib] 2::- , and 31-43(12) :- U. {c} Show that there is no mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium where pga) = l}, pglfb} 2:: U, and pc} r:- ll. (cl) Show that there is no mixeistrategy Nash equilibrium where mfa) 2::- 0, Palm > n, and me} = n- [e} There is a {unique} mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium where pglfe} 2:- l}, pgi] = l], and pc} 3- U. Compute this equilibrium