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A finite-horizon game with perfect information Use the procedure of backward induction to predict equilibria of the following game. 1 C D E 2 (3,

A finite-horizon game with perfect information Use the procedure of backward induction to predict equilibria of the following game. 1 C D E 2 (3, 0) F (1, 0) G 2 (1, 1) H (2, 1) I 2 (2, 2) J (1, 3)

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