A firm is looking to hire a worker with complete college education. There are two types of such workers: high-productivity, with marginal productivity of 20, and low-productivity, with marginal productivity of zero. Out of all students completing college, a fraction p; has high productivity, and the rest (p; = 1 pp) have low productivity. The firm is risk-neutral. That is, it only cares about expected profits associated from hiring a worker: the difference between the expected productivity and the wage. 6. Now assume that the firm cannot observe the worker's type. What is the probability that a random job applicant will be a low-productivity worker? Assuming the firm is risk-neutral, what is the highest wage it would be willing to pay for college-educated workers? a) Probability: pp, Highest wage: 20py, b) Probability: py, Highest wage: 20(1 p) (c) Probability: 1 pp, Highest wage: 20(1 pp) (d) Probability: 1 py, Highest wage: 20py, (e) Probability: 1 p, Highest wage: 0 ~