A is a good driver with a probability of 0.1 of having an accident and B is less careful and has an accident probability of 0.2. Each has a car initially valued at $10,000, and with a value of zero in the event of an accident. They each have no other wealth. They can each buy fair insurance of any positive amount up to $10,000. If cb is consumption (in $'s) in the "state" where an accident occurs, and cg is consumption in the "state" where no accident occurs, then in a diagram with cg on the horizontal axis and cb on the vertical axis suppose that insurance is offered to both A and B at the same rate of $0.15 per $1 of coverage. If both A and B are risk neutral, (a) B will choose to not insure at all, A will insure fully. (b) Both will insure fully at a cost of 0.15 $10,000. (c) Both will insure partially, but B will buy more coverage than A (d) A will choose to not insure at all, B will insure fully