A large number n of investors make a joint investment (of 1 unit each) which yields a return r > 1 (per unit invested) if it matures. For the project to mature requires that at least L, 1 < L < n, investors do not withdraw their money early. Yet, each investor may experience an interim liquidity shock which forces her to withdraw. More formally, an investor may be one of two types. Type 1 of investor i occurs with a small probability 0, making i's payoff function u1 (s) = 1 - s, where si {0, 1}. With probability 1-0, investor i is of type 2 and has payoff function U2 (s): = TS if =18;2L 1-si if -18; (1) 0 (1-0) (0-4) 0)(n-k) 1+r k=1 (a) Write down a "rough" extensive form of this game, assuming n = 2 and L = 1. (b) Find a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of this game. (For the general case.)