A large population of animals meet and either fight over or share a food source. There are two types in the population: one always fights, and the other always shares. For the purposes of this question, assume that no other mutant types can arise in the population. Suppose that the value of the food source is 200 calories and that caloric intake determines each player's reproductive fitness. If two sharing types meet one another, they each get half the food, but if a sharer meets a fighter, there is no fight, and the fighter gets the food worth of 150 calories and the sharer gets the remaining food. Lets be the proportion of sharers in the population. Suppose that the cost of a fight is 100 calories for each fighter (regardless of a win or a loss) and that when two fighters meet, each is equally likely to win the fight and the food or to lose and get no food. Answer the following questions: 1. Find the fitness of the sharing type. 2. Find the fitness of the fighting type. 3. Find any evolutionary stable equilibria of the game