Question
A manufacturer of flash drives has a profit function =t2q^2wheretis the price charged for a flash drive andq^2 is the cost of producing a drive
A manufacturer of flash drives has a profit function =t2q^2wheretis the price charged for a flash drive andq^2 is the cost of producing a drive whose capacity isqgigabytes. A consumer of type has a utility functionu=qt, where takes on a value of 12 forH-type consumers, or 9 forL-type consumers.
There are 10 consumers of each type. A consumer gets zero utility if she does not buy.If a consumer is indifferent between buying two flash drives, assume she will buy the one with more gigabytes. If a consumer is indifferent between buying a flash drive and not buying, assume she will buy.
a) Suppose(q^L,t^L)is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under complete information. What is the value oft^L?
b) Suppose(q^H,t^H)is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for H-type consumer under complete information. What is the value oft^H?
c) What is the seller's overall profit under complete information?
For part d) - i), assume information is asymmetric.
d) Suppose that the seller continues to offer the capacity-price bundles that maximises his profit under complete information: that is, he offers(q^L,t^L)and(q^H,t^H). What is the utility for the Lconsumer from buying the(q^H,t^H)bundle? That is, what isuL(q^H,t^H)?
e) What is the utility for the Hconsumer from buying the(q^L,t^L)bundle? That is, what isuH(q^L,t^L)?
f) What are the seller's profits if he offers the bundles(q^L,t^L)and(q^H,t^H)when information is asymmetric?
Now suppose the seller decides to offer a menu of capacity-price bundles(qL,tL)and(qH,tH)to incentives the two types of consumers to sort themselves out. Answer part g) to i) in this context.
g)ForH-type consumer, what is the optimal (profit maximising) level of qH?
h) Suppose(q*L,t*L)is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle forL-type consumer under asymmetric information. What is the value oft*L?
i) What is the seller's overall profit under asymmetric information if the seller offers a menu of profit maximizing capacity-price bundles(qL,tL)and(qH,tH)to consumers?
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