A monopolist has no fixed costs and a constant marginal cost equal to $4 per unit. It faces the following demand schedule: Quantity Demanded If this monopolist can perfectly price discriminate, what is the price for the last unit sold? t'i'Note: please do not include the $ in your answer ** A monopolist has no fixed costs and a constant marginal cost equal to $4 per unit. It faces the following demand schedule: Quantity Demanded If this monopolist can perfectly price discriminate, how many units will it produce to maximise its profits? Peter's Pills is the only chemist in a small town. Peter's is located near the train station and gets a significant portion of its business from travellers change train lines. The demand for toothpaste by local customers and travellers is given by the table below. A Quantity Quantity Price Per Unit Demanded Demanded [Locals] {Travellers} $15 0 1 $13 0 2 511 o 3 $9 2 4 $7 4 5 $5 8 5 $3 15 r 51 32 s Peter's can buy toothpaste from a wholesale supplier for $2 per tube. The manager of Peter's has realised that the store can charge different prices to locals and travellers by offering a "locals discount\" to anyone with an ID showing an address in the town. To maximise its profits, Peters should offer a discount (the difference the price charged to travellers and the price charged to locals) equal to 3. Answer: x Consider the following pay-off matrix for two players with two possible strategies. (Player E payoffs and strategies are depicted in italics.) Player B Action X Action Y Action X 20, 10 50, -10 Player A Action Y -10, 40 30, 40 Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria? O a. (X,X) only O b. (Y,Y) only O c. Both (X,X) and (Y, ) O d. Both (X, Y) and (Y,X) O e. None of these are Nash equilibria