Question
A public facility needs to be located on a street , which I denote by the interval [0, 1]. In the city there are n
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A public facility needs to be located on a street , which I denote by the interval [0, 1].
In the city there are n voters. Each voter i has an ideal location pi, 0 pi 1, where 1
she wants the facility to be located. If the facility is located at l, 0 l 1, then the
utility of voter i is
(pi l)2
The following voting game is played to decide on the location. Every citizen/ voter i votes for a location xi, where 0 xi 1. Given the voted location profile, x = (x1, , xn) the facility is chosen at location W (x) where W (x) is a rule that picks a location for every voted location profile x. We call W(x) a voting rule. The specific W (x) that the city uses, is the following:
W(x) = W(x1, ,xn) = min{x1, ,xn}
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(a) Define the game in normal form. (5 points)
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(b) (8 points) Is it the case that, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to vote for her ideal location, given the voting rule described above. Explain why, or why not.
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(c) (7 points) If instead the city used the voting rule, V (x) = V (x1, , xn) = max{x1, , xn}
Would you answer to part (b) change ? Why, or why not ?
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