A public good will be funded by 10 agents at a pro-capite cost of 500 euros, provided the sum of the declared net willingnesses to pay for it, 500, i = 1,..., 10 is non-negative. If the true gross willingnesses to pay for the public good are, in euros, y = 22 = 23=1/4 = 1/5 = 400, 6 = 300, 07 = Ug = 600, U = U10 = 800, and the decision mechanism is the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke one what is (in equilibrium) the final decision, who will pay the Clarke tax, and for what amounts? a) the public good is funded, nobody pays the Clarke tax b) the public good is funded, everybody pays a Clarke tax of 10 euros e) the public good is funded, agents 9 and 10 pay a Clarke tax of 200 euros d) the public good is not funded, agent 6 pays a Clarke tax of 300 euros e) NOPAC.