A question about game theory

Question 3: Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (r = 1). Each of the two candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a campaign platform (i.e., a point on the line between 1 = 0 and x = 1). The voters observe the two candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If the candidates choose platforms x1 = .3 and x2 - .6, for example, then all voters to the left of r = .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the election with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates care only about being elected - they do not really care about their platforms at all! What is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium