A risk neutral worker has a reservation wage of $500$ and a cost of high effort of $279.$ Depending on the effort put by the worker and some random luck factor, the employer will earn $2500($if the worker puts high effort and he gets lucky$),$ or $1500($if the worker puts high effort and he gets unlucky OR if the worker puts low effort and he gets lucky$),$ or $500($if the worker puts low effort and he gets unlucky$).$ Assume the worker gets lucky with probability $0\mathrm{.}4.$ The employer wants to incentivize the worker to put high effort and decides to pay the worker an incentive contract comprised of a fixed wage of $$500$ plus a bonus paid only if the profit of $2500$ is realized. Calculate the optimal such bonus that the employer should pay, if it wants to incentivize the worker and maximize its profits at the same time. Round your answer to $2$ decimals, if needed.