A risk-neutral firm produces chemical products, and its objective is to maximize expected profit. There is a risk that there will be an accident accident, the firm can choose Low or High investment in safety. Low Investment in Safety Cost for firm= $0 Probability of an Accident =80% Probability of No Accident =20% High investmont in Safely Cost for firm =$150 Probability of an Accident =20% Probability of No Accident =80% The Government wants to reduce the risk of an accident, but the Government cannot observe the firm's investment in safety. Therefore there is a moral hazard problem. However, the Govemment can observe whether an accident occurred or not. So the government decides to create a fine (penalty); if an accident occurs, the firm must pay a fine F to the Government. If an accident does not occurs, then the firm does not havo. Compute the minimum fino F that the Govemment must impose, in order to solvo the moral hazard problem and guarantee that the firm will choose the high investment in safety. F