A Short Primer on Ethical Theory By William Hawk & Gerald Schlabach Relativism -- Cultural relativity is the descriptive claim that different cultures have different cultural practices. This observation is hardly new; ancient philosophers already distinguished between customary law which differed among peoples and natural law which purportedly held for all peoples. Still, with the development of modern anthropological research beginning in the 19th century awareness of cultural relativity became more widespread. In response, a group of 20th century thinkers, the most famous of whom is Ruth Benedict, took these empirical observations as the basis for a somewhat different view, ethical relativism. Ethical relativism holds that there are no universal, or absolute, or objective ethical standards which apply across cultures. But cultural relativity (which is a description of human anthropology and sociology) is not sufficient to establish ethical relativism (a prescriptive theory for human conduct). The difficulty is that no elaboration of what is, is sufficient to determine what ought to be. For this reason, and others, most philosophers reject ethical relativism while admitting that moral practices differ markedly from one culture to another. Regardless of cultural context the holocaust, the actions of Jeffrey Dahmer and torturing innocent children for fun are wrong. The question typically is not whether or not these types of actions are wrong but what makes them wrong. The out-and-out relativist will have trouble saying why these things are wrong. An apparent contradiction and further difficulty with ethical relativism is that it actually seems to require at least one universal norm: tolerance. Here we see the appeal of ethical relativism in our own society. Our form of government is founded in part on the principle that it is good to tolerate as much as possible, at least. Given the fact of growing pluralism (political, religious, cultural, ethnic) many people have given up on reaching moral consensus on most questions of behavior. Even so, any theory of human rights which seeks to establish a rational basis for the principles of tolerance and respect must rely on universal principles (which ethical relativism would disallow), or it will have no answer to rival political systems which claim that every culture can define human rights the way it wants. You may wish to note examples such as the following, and discuss whether approval of the differences (or similarities) in each case constitutes a description of cultural relativity or a prescription for ethical relativism. Americans drive on the right side of the road; the British drive on the left side of the road. An Amish person never wears a wedding ring; a salesman on a business trip removes his wedding ring before entering a bar. A tribe in Africa kills its weakest infants in a time of famine; a religious cult in Europe practices human sacrifice once a year. Had the Nazis won World War II they might have put some people on trial for not killing Jews,- when the Allies won World War II they held the Nurenberg trials for Nazis who had participated in the holocaust in any way. Consequentialism -- Consequentialism holds that what makes an action right or wrong is its consequences only. There is no reason to look at the agent's motivation or intent, whether there was a duty or obligation to perform the action, whether it is the type of action that embodied human excellence or is commanded by God. The only relevant consideration in morality is outcome for good or ill. You may wish to note that even though the following examples represent different sides of the same issues, they all comprise consequentialist arguments: An environmentalist argues against hunting out of fear of species extinction. A hunter argues back that culling is necessary for species balance. A union activist argues against a plant closing because of the effect that the loss ofjobs will have on the community, on the incidence of alcoholism and domestic violence, etc. The CEO of the company that owns the plant argues for down-sizing as the way to save as manyjobs as possible. A pro-choice activist argues that without the right to an abortion, women will be more vulnerable to various kinds of discrimination. A pro-life activist argues that the widespread practice of abortion leads to callous disregard for human life more broadly. The two most common forms of consequentialism are these: Ethical Egoism: The ethical egoist maintains that an action is right in as much as it maximizes my own good and wrong insofar as it detracts from my self interest. As with other consequentialists, the ethical egoist believes consequences alone make an action right or wrong, good or bad. What distinguishes the egoist from other consequentialists is that egoists measure only consequences to themselves, i.e. their own self interest, and not consequences to anyone else. Problems for ethical egoism include (1) the generally perceived failure to be able to give a convincing account for why one is justified in privileging their own interest and (2) the secondary practical problem of difficulties in identifying what is and what is not in one's own self-interest. (This problem may be stated in terms of short-term versus long-term consequences or the difficulty in knowing what is good for oneself.) Observations: Ethical egoism depends heavily on an argument from "reality" {what is or is perceived to be). It observes that people are egoistic anyway, and argues that ethics must take into account the "facts" of the human condition. In order to explain why one may actually be ethical when acting from or encouraging selfishness, ethical egoism is often coupled with a second argument from what "is" that if everyone seeks their own self-interest, they will achieve the best result anyway. The most prominent version of this argument is Adam Smith's "invisible hand\" theory of the marketplace, which attempts to explain why greed turns out to be good for society as a whole. The need to appeal to "best results" at least for most people already moves us toward the second kind of consequentialism: Utilitarianism: The principle of utility as outlined by John Stuart Mill is that one is obligated morally to produce the greatest good for the greatest number. Mill identified the good with utility (Bentham, Mill's teacher, considered the good to be pleasure). In calculating whether an action is right or wrong, one needs to project the total consequences for good or ill, and determine the action that will optimize utility in the situation. For such calculations each person's interests are to count for one (you cannot privilege your own interests) and the outcome should maximize (or optimize) positive results. Problems for consequentialism are: 1) the theory does not seem to account for the general perception that some acts are right or wrong in themselves regardless of consequences, 2) there are no distributive justice restrictions--individuals might be called upon to make ultimate sacrifices so that the net utility is maximized and 3) the theory requires that agents be able to predict future outcomes with a degree of reliability that is unrealistic. Observations: The article 'A Mother Sacrifices Life So That Twins Can Be Born included in Appendix B of the student materials illustrates this theory but upon reflection also suggests how rarely circumstances allow for such a clean, clear calculation of one-life-for-two. Still, utilitarian calculation may be suitable, or even unavoidable, for many questions of public policy (space exploration vs. public housing; art museums vs. football stadiums vs. money for education). In personal decision-making too, many of us find ourselves doing rough estimates (family time vs. sacrifices for work and study; vocational choices concerning where one can do the most good; conscientious consumer choices about whether buying goods from 3rd world factories will help or hurt the poor). Upon examination, however, it seems we weigh many of these decisions intuitively, not through the kind of dispassionate moral calculus that utilitarianism would require. In really tough cases, any actual calculation of the greatest good for the greatest number must face difficulties (even if one discounts the earlier list of problems and accepts the premise of utilitarianism): What is the basic unit of measurement that applies to every kind of qualitatively different good? May one rank goods, and how? If pleasure is the basic unit of measurement, does the intensity of pleasure count? What about long-term vs. short- term considerations? And again, what about the potential injustice if the suffering of a few adds to the sum total of good for many? Utilitarian theorists have struggled with such problems for a century and a half and have not been able to agree among themselves, much less satisfy their critics. Deontology -- Deontology says that for evaluating the moral worth of an action or the goodness of an agent the consequences do not matter. What matters is the disinterested will of a person to follow the dictates of reason, principle and duty, whatever the cost or consequences may turn out to be. Immanuel Kant and John Rawls provide two of the most important versions of deontology: Categorical imperative: Immanuel Kant argued that the only indication of the rightness or wrongness of an action is the demand of reason as articulated in the categorical imperative (i.e., that duty which bears upon every possible kind of moral situation, whatever the facts may be). If we follow our sentiments, our emotions or our expectations for goodness we are often misled and tempted to act to our own 3 benefit. Reason, on the other hand, provides a source of unqualified demands on us; it tells us what we should do regardless of our own interests. Kant proposed various versions of the categorical imperative and argued that each of them implied or led to all the others. These include: "Act on the maxim that you can will to be a universal law."--i.e. what are you willing to make a rule for anyone in a similar situation? "Act on the maxim that you can will to be a universal law of nature." Were you in a position to change the laws of nature so that everyone would automatically act as you do in the situation, how would you act? "The respect principle"i.e. treat humanity, whether in yourself or others, always as an end and never as a means only. By way of example you might discuss questions such as these: Why not shop-lift even if you knew you could get away with it? Why not torture for any reason? Observations: Despite the rigor with which Kant argued, and despite the attractiveness of his theory for anyone who longs for moral absolutes which the previous theories seem to lack, Kantian ethics has encountered its own set of objections. (1) To pay no attention at all to consequences would seem troubling in its own right; Kant would apparently have us tell the truth even to an ax-murder who knocks at our door and asks whether his would-be victim is hiding inside. Are there no exceptions whatsoever to duties and absolute principles? (2) Situations and moral dilemmas seem to arise in which duties conflict, and we cannot fulfill one without violating or neglecting another. Abortion to save the life of the mother may be one such case. (3} By basing his entire theory on disinterested reason Kant seems neglect or even undermine accounts of how people actually grow in moral character. People develop their moral sensitivity in particular families and communities which shape their very identities and commitments; by requiring us to rely on universal reason alone Kant seems to ask us to write off all of the commitments that have shaped our identities as though they were mere \"interests." Do we not grow in moral virtue precisely by caring deeply about certain things? (4) Why in fact should we care about being moral at all? By discounting the particular interests, commitments, and motives that make us who we are as human beings, Kant has made it harder to answer this fundamental question. Justice as fairness: Rawls contends that Kant is correct in identifying the propensity to benefit our own set of interests as the source of moral failure, but he is not as hopeful about isolated, disinterested reason giving moral guidelines. Rawls suggests that we must imagine a situation where a group of persons are gathered together to formulate fundamental principles for their living together (the original position). In order to keep from a dispute over individual interests, Rawls envisions these persons as not yet having key information about themselves such as their gender, age, race, ability or disability, preferences, and plans of life (veil of ignorance). They do know that they will have particular interests 4 once the veil is lifted and their identities are revealed, but since they all must anticipate the possibility that they will be the least advantaged in society, they will presumably reason their way to a set of principles that guarantees respect for all. If you conceive of a group of rational, yet disinterested parties forced to agree under the veil of ignorance you will generate principles ofjustice which should govern all relationships. Rawls considers these principles to be 1. All citizens enjoy an equal right to basic liberties, limited only by such restrictions as guarantee that all others enjoy the same liberties (the political principle) 2. Economic inequalities are only justified insofar as they benefit the least advantaged (the economic principle) 3. All positions and offices must be open to all according to conditions of fair equality of opportunity (the social principle) Observations: Rawls is a political philosopher and so is not so interested in personal decision-making as he is in the philosophical basis for our constitutional system. Only by extension does it help explain one's duty, for example, to obey the rules of the institution where one works or studies, or to account for marital fidelity in secular society. Any such application of his contractarianism to personal or business ethics must be by way of analogy, with an eye out for ways that his theory might not apply in spheres of life other than politics and constitutional law. Still, Rawls provides us a prominent example of how any contractarian ethic works. Contractarianism is less confident than Kantian ethics that there are innate principles which apply to all people everywhere, and sees any moral system as a contract that a society "constructs" (perhaps implicitly) in order to live together according to common principles. It is the emphasis on common principles of respect and fairness, which can be explained through reason, which makes this too a deontological ethic. Note that even though Rawls takes more account of human interests than did Kant, his approach is still open to criticisms similar to the 3rd and 4th ones listed in the section above concerning Kant. In other words, Rawls still requires us to imagine ourselves as anyone, thus disavowing the very moral communities that have shaped our identities, our convictions, and our moral character. This observation leads us to the next kind of theory: Human Excellence Theory (Virtue Ethics) -- The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle considered ethics the art of living well. As a naturalist, Aristotle conceived of each being, including human beings, as having a set of natural dispositions that need to be fully actualized in order for that entity to achieve its specific excellence (virtue). The question for ethics is, does the act or practice lead to human flourishing, to the development of distinctively human capacities or characteristics? The concern is not so much for doing what is morally obligatory (motive) or what turns out to achieve the optimal utility (consequences). Those concerns may follow indirectly, but only in light of a clear conception of what nurtures and nourishes fully actualized human beings. Because Aristotle understood human beings to be "social animals" who could only flourish and find their individual fulfillment in community, human excellence theory tends to emphasize the role of the community in shaping our virtues, and in turn defines the virtues as characteristics that contribute to healthy community life. The skill required for the moral person here is not first of all that of identifying the correct rational rule or predicting the proper outcome but that of identifying truly excellent human beings and modeling the practices that lead to human excellence. The moral life then turns out to look more like apprenticeship under the guidance of a fine craftsperson than it looks like following rules or calculating consequences. The craftsperson will be able to articulate both the rules of the craft and the consequences of various practices in light of the standards of excellence in the craft. But above all, she will model the actions that make for both excellent products and excellent practice of the craft. The fact that this kind of moral life can only take place in relationship suggests another reason why human excellence theory usually insists that we can only be excellent human beings in community. Observations: Donaldson & Werhane describe modern consequentialism as a "teleological" system (p. 3 in the 5th edition) but any ethical theory which stresses human excellence will also be teleological in another more classical sense, for it too will stress the object, end, or goal of moral action. Human flourishing, after all, is the long-term "consequence" that this sort of ethical system seeks. There is a very important difference however, and students should be able to recognize it if one describes consequentialism as a short-term teleology in pursuit of many possible goods, and human excellence theory as a long-term teleology in pursuit of a single over-arching human good which (theoretically, at least) orients and establishes rules for the pursuit of all other goods. Note Aristotle's assumption that there is in fact a single definition of human flourishing. A serious problem now comes into View for human excellence theory, however. Is there really such a definition? And what if we can't agree on what it is? The problem of cultural relativity recurs here. Different cultures and communities have different visions of human flourishing and excellence. In turn they have different tables of virtues, embodied by different kinds of heroes. A student in Aristotle's Greece was supposed to model himself after the proud warriors in the epics of Homer. A Christian in the early church was supposed to model herself after the humble martyrs and saints who were in turn modeling themselves after Jesus and his Beatitudes. Are we back to ethical relativism therefore? Ethicists who stress human excellence or virtue sometimes respond that no, we have simply identified more clearly the agenda for a coherent debate over moral issues. They say that modern society is at an impasse over so many moral issues precisely because so many people have given up even trying to identify a common good to which all people and institutions in society have a responsibility to contribute. Only in light ofa vision of human beings flourishing together in community will we be able understand properly: 0 both the duties we must fulfill and the consequences we should seek - how we grow and develop in the moral life 0 our social responsibilities as well as our individual rights 0 and why businesses do have social responsibilities Still, the problem of defining any ultimate purpose for human life, or even "the common good" in a pluralistic society, is formidable. Many fear that any apparent agreement will in fact mean one community imposing its definition upon other communities. Perhaps that is why human excellence theory seems to work best in smaller, self-defined communities that already have a common story, agreed-upon heroes or saints, and a shared definition of excellence. Religious communities are the most obvious example. Yet religious ethics turns out to draw on most of the above theories too: Religious Ethics Various religious traditions codify practices as being morally required usually basing them on God's command or demand for human beings. Divine command theories of ethics ground the rightness or wrongness of action in God's directive (ten commandments, Sermon on the Mount, principles such as love, justice or \"do unto others as you would have them do to you"). Roman Catholic ethics represent a blend of human excellence ethics (Aristotle via St. Thomas Aquinas) and divine command ethics; notice how the U.S. Catholic bishops, in Economic Justice for All blend a deontological argument for respecting the human dignity of all with a human excellence argument for seeking the common good. Anabaptist ethics appear to use another blend of divine command (New Testament models and directives) with human excellence theory where Christ is both the supreme teacher and the model for all disciples to emulate (like apprentices) together as a community of believers which interprets both teaching and model in the face of new and specific situations. Protestant theorists emphasize requirements of love and justice. With the tremendous diversity in religious commitment the challenge to any version of religious ethics is establishing its particular interpretation as actually authorized by God